Ignorance in the Relational Model by Fokkinga, Maarten M.
I have a dream. . .
Ignorance in the Relational Model
Maarten M. Fokkinga
DB group, dept INF, fac EWI, University of Twente
PO Box 217, NL 7500 AE Enschede, Netherlands
m.m.fokkinga@utwente.nl
Abstract. We hypothesize that an extension-
with-conditioning of Dempster-Shafer theory is
suitable for encoding uncertainty and ignorance
in the Relational Model. We present a formal
and well-motivated definition of conditioning, and
show the spirit of the required change in the Re-
lational Model and some results that then follow.
It remains to be investigated whether these re-
sults are satisfactory.
Introduction
1 Ignorance
Ignorance is closely related to uncertainty. Commonly, we
say that a property is uncertain if it is not considered true
or false but, instead, it is assigned a probability of being
true. Now consider a set of exhaustive and mutually dis-
joint properties. Probability theory requires that the prob-
abilities assigned to these properties add up to 1. Ignorance
is the phenomenom that the “probabilities” do not add up
to 1. Formally, one axiom of probability theory is not ful-
filled, and hence we speak of belief instead of probability.
Dempster-Shafer theory gives a proper formalization (sum-
marized in paragraph 8–10), and we shall build upon that
theory (paragraph 11–15).
2 Setting
Our work is an attempt to improve upon Choenni et al. [1, 2]
in the following aspects: a more fundamental approach and
better motivated definition of conditioning, and a better for-
malization of an extension of the Relational Model in order
to deal with ignorance. We borrow the following example
from Choenni [1], and take it to be the leading example.
3 Example: CIA
The ship type department of the CIA has 0.6 evidence that
the type of ship Maria is Frigate, and 0.3 evidence that it
is Tugboat ; for the remaining 0.1 there is ignorance. This is
encoded in the one-row table SHIP below at the left. The
type speed department of the CIA has evidence that 30%
of the frigates has a max speed of 20 knots, and 70% has
30 knots, whereas all tugboats have a 15 knots max speed.
This is encoded in the two-row table DESC ription at the
right:
SHIP
Name Type
Maria Frigate 7→ 0.6
Tugboat 7→ 0.3
* 7→ 0.1
DESC
Type Speed
Frigate 20K 7→ 0.3
30K 7→ 0.7
Tugboat 15K 7→ 1.0
For the purpose of decision making, the US government re-
quests to join the information. Here are two candidate re-
sults that they might get offered:
join candidate 1
Name Type Speed
Maria Frigate 20K 7→ 0.18
Frigate 30K 7→ 0.42
Tugboat 15K 7→ 0.3
* * 7→ 0.1
join candidate 2
Name Type Speed
Maria Frigate 20K 7→ 0.18
Frigate 30K 7→ 0.42
Tugboat * 7→ 0.3
* 20K 7→ 0.03
* 30K 7→ 0.07
Maria Frigate * 7→ 0.6
Tugboat 15K 7→ 0.3
* 15K 7→ 0.1
The one-row table join candidate 1 is obtained by “intuitive
combination”. However, the information in this table is too
weak in the sense that the probability of “the max speed of
Maria is 20K” has an upperbound (when all ignorance goes
to this case) of 0.18 + 0.1 = 0.28, whereas that upperbound
is 0.6×0.3+0.1×0.3 = 0.21 according the original SHIP and
DESC .
The two-row table join candidate 2 is proposed by Choenni
et al. [1]. This information is too strong : The first row of
the table expresses that the probability of “the max speed of
Maria is 20K” has a lowerbound (when all ignorance about
the speed is not in favor of this case) of 0.18 + 0.03 = 0.21,
whereas that lowerbound is only 0.6×0.3 = 0.18 according
to SHIP informally joined with DESC .
4 Goal, plan
Our goal is to extend the Relational Model and relational
operators (like projection, selection, and in particular the
join) in such a way that we can offer the US government
the right information. Moreover, we should also be able to
relate in a formal way the above candidate joins to “the cor-
rect join” of SHIP and DESC . The next paragraph gives
the outline of the theory that we want to develop, and para-
graph 6 discusses the previous example in the theory that
we envisage.
5 Hypothesis, focus
In order to deal with uncertainty and ignorance, Dempster
has weakened probability theory to what currently is known
as Dempster-Shafer theory. The primary notion is bpa (ba-
sic probability assignment), from which the notions of belief,
plausibility, and ignorance can be defined; and conversely.
Our hypothesis is that an extension of Dempster-Shafer the-
ory provides a solution for the problem how to deal with
uncertainty and ignorance in the Relational Model, and we
want to investigate this hypothesis. The main line, then is
as follows.
In the leading example of paragraph 3, we start out with
bpa’s as attribute values in the table, and observe that all
our attempts for a join lead to a table with a “bpa covering
several attributes”, which we call tupled-bpa, or just t-bpa
for short. It can be shown that this generalization (our gen-
eralization!) of bpa to t-bpa is not essential: t-bpa’s can be
expressed as bpa’s (though at considerable loss of readabil-
ity), and vice versa. Continuing with taking joins of the
resulting table with other tables will lead to tables in which
t-bpa’s cover more and more attributes. Therefore we gen-
eralize the notion of relation right away to one where each
row is a t-bpa.
Moreover, we see that in Choenni’s attempt the failure is
due to the omission of a condition in the bpa: the 0.03 ev-
idence for max speed 20K cannot be given unconditionally,
but is only valid if it is known that the type is Frigate.
Therefore we generalize right away to one where each row
is a “conditioned t-bpa”, or ct-bpa for short; the definition
of “conditioned bpa” (or conditioned t-bpa) is new and is
the focus is this paper. This notion of conditioning differs
entirely from the notion of conditioning briefly discussed by
Shafer [3], from the notion defined by Choenni [1, 2], and
from the notion of conditioning as known in probability the-
ory.
6 Envisaged solution
Once the conditioning (and tupling) extension to Dempster-
Shafer theory has been developed and, based on this, also a
new Relational Model, we expect to be able to deal formally
with the example in the following way.
To deal with uncertainty and ignorance is quite straightfor-
ward: let each row in each table be a ct-bpa. We call such
relations: ui-relations, where the letters ‘ui’ derive from ‘un-
certainty and ignorance’. For example, we encode the one-
row table SHIP of paragraph 3 as an ui-relation with one
row (that is, one ct-bpa) with the following pretty-print:
SHIP ′
Name Type Name Type
* Frigate | Maria * 7→ 0.6
* Tugboat | Maria * 7→ 0.3
* * | Maria * 7→ 0.1
Fully written out the relation reads as in Figure 1.
Each star, ∗, is pronounced “unknown” and stands for the
entire domain of the corresponding attribute: the Name-star
stands for {Maria, . . .}, the Type-star stands for {Frigate,
Tugboat , . . .}, and so on. The meaning of the first line of the
above one-row relation is, roughly: “there is evidence 0.6
for that the type is Frigate on the condition that the ship is
Maria. More precisely, the line means:
There is evidence 0.6 for the property
(Name,Type) ⊆ (unknown, {Frigate})
on the condition that
(Name,Type) ⊆ ({Maria}, unknown)
is true.
Here it is understood that (U ,V ) ⊆ (X ,Y ) means: U⊆X ∧
V⊆Y .
So, the one-row ui-relation SHIP ′ given above encodes that
the ship type department of the CIA has 0.6 evidence that
the type of a ship is Frigate if its name is Maria, and 0.3
evidence that it is Tugboat ; for the remainder there is igno-
rance.
Further, the type speed department of the CIA has evidence
that 30% of the frigates has a max speed of 20 knots, and
70% has 30 knots, whereas all tugboats have a 15 knots max
speed. This is encoded in the two-row ui-relation with the
following pretty-print:
DESC ′ Type Speed Type Speed
* 20K | Frigate * 7→ 0.3
* 30K | Frigate * 7→ 0.7
* 15K | Tugboat * 7→ 1.0
For the purpose of decision making, the US government re-
quests to join the information. Here is what they get:
SHIP ′ ./DESC ′
Name Type Speed Name Type Speed
* Frigate 20K | Maria * * 7→ 0.18
* Frigate 30K | Maria * * 7→ 0.42
* Tugboat * | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * 20K | Maria Frigate * 7→ 0.03
* * 30K | Maria Frigate * 7→ 0.07
* Frigate * | Maria * * 7→ 0.6
* Tugboat 15K | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * 15K | Maria Tugboat * 7→ 0.1
Note the last two lines of the first row, and the last line of
the second row: these say that the ship type is unknown
but yet the speed is certain to some degree if the type
happens to be frigate or tugboat, respectively. (And if
{
({Name 7→ *, Type 7→ {Frigate}} | {Name 7→ {Maria}, Type 7→ *}) 7→ 0.6,
({Name 7→ *, Type 7→ {Tugboat}} | {Name 7→ {Maria}, Type 7→ *}) 7→ 0.3,
({Name 7→ *, Type 7→ * } | {Name 7→ {Maria}, Type 7→ *}) 7→ 0.1
}
Figure 1: Fully written-out one-row ui-relation SHIP ′ (see paragraph 6).
the condition is not fulfilled, the evidence supports just
unknown — see paragraph 12.) In order to eliminate this
fine-grained conditioned information and obtain information
that is somewhat easier to understand for the US govern-
ment, we can weaken each row by “condition-restricting it
to {Name}”, that is, replacing all conditions except Name
by unknown, which we will be able to denote formally by
({Name}Jc) * (SHIP
′ ./DESC ′):
Name Type Speed Name Type Speed
* Frigate 20K | Maria * * 7→ 0.18
* Frigate 30K | Maria * * 7→ 0.42
* Tugboat * | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * * | Maria * * 7→ 0.03+0.07
* Frigate * | Maria * * 7→ 0.6
* Tugboat 15K | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * * | Maria * * 7→ 0.1
Taking the “least upper bound” of the two rows gives the
following one-row ui-relation:
Name Type Speed Name Type Speed
* Frigate 20K | Maria * * 7→ 0.18
* Frigate 30K | Maria * * 7→ 0.42
* Tugboat 15K | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * * | Maria * * 7→ 0.1
As observed in paragraph 3 this information is too weak.
Phrased in our concepts, the kind of join that Choenni [1]
(and [2]?) proposes, yields for SHIP ′ and DESC ′ the fol-
lowing ui-relation (again, compare with paragraph 3):
Name Type Speed Name Type Speed
* Frigate 20K | Maria * * 7→ 0.18
* Frigate 30K | Maria * * 7→ 0.42
* Tugboat * | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * 20K | Maria * * 7→ 0.03
* * 30K | Maria * * 7→ 0.07
* Frigate * | Maria * * 7→ 0.6
* Tugboat 15K | Maria * * 7→ 0.3
* * 15K | Maria * * 7→ 0.1
As observed in paragraph 3 this information is too strong.
The well›known Dempster›Shafer theory
Although in the running example there are three domains
(Name, Type, and Speed), Dempster-Shafer theory deals
only with one domain. This restriction is without loss of
generality, as discussed in paragraph 15.
7 Notational conventions
We consider functions to be sets of argument-result pairs,
and use the notation x 7→ y as a suggestive synonym for the
pair (x , y). So, the set {a 7→ 3, b 7→ 2, c 7→ 3} is a function
that maps a to 3, maps b to 2, and c to 3. For summation
we use a notation without subscripting:
Σ x , y • expr(x , y) Σ x , y | cond(x , y) • expr(x , y)
= Σx ,y expr(x , y) = Σx ,y s. th. cond(x ,y) expr(x , y)
We do so because in some cases the ‘x , y | cond(x , y)’ part is
just too large to be written as a subscript (see for example
paragraph 13).
In the context of a set D we let P ,Q vary over subsets of D ,
that is, P ,Q :
 
D , and we sometimes write * for D .
8 Basic probability assignment
For the reader not familiar with Dempster-Shafer theory,
we provide an intuition in the appendix paragraph 18. We
build on this intuition later when we generalize the theory
with conditioning.
Let D be a finite set. A basic probability assignment over D ,
abbreviated bpa, is a total function m :
 
D  [0, 1] satisfy-
ing:
m P = 0 whenever P = 
ΣP • m P = 1
The latter equation means that the sum of values m P , for
all subsets P of D , equals 1.
Sometimes, a bpa is called a mass function, hence letter m
for bpa’s. We omit the entries {. . .} 7→ 0 in the presentation
of a bpa. A bpa m induces a belief Bel , a plausibility Pl ,
and an ignorance Ig as total functions of type
 
D  [0, 1]
as follows:
Bel P = ΣP ′ | P ′ ⊆ P • m P ′
Pl P = 1− Bel(D \ P)
Ig P = Pl P − Bel P
A single value d ∈ D may be considered as a bpa, namely
the bpa md that maps every P ⊆ D to zero except P = {d},
that is, md = {{d} 7→ 1}.
9 Example
Department m of the CIA has 0.6 evidence that the type of
a certain ship is Frigate, and 0.3 evidence that it is Tugboat ;
for the remainder there is ignorance. The department is
characterized as follows, as a bpa over {Frigate,Tugboat , . . .}:
m = {{Frigate} 7→ 0.6, {Tugboat} 7→ 0.3, * 7→ 0.1}
Recall that * stands for the full set {Frigate,Tugboat , . . .}.
10 Combination of bpa’s
Dempster defines a combination ⊕ of bpa’s, now commonly
known as Dempster’s combination rule, or orthogonal sum.
We give the formal definition here, and our intuition in ap-
pendix paragraph 19. We build on this intuition later when
we generalize the theory with conditioning.
Letm1 andm2 be bpa’s over D . If constant κ, defined below,
equals 0, then the combination of m1 and m2 is said not to
exist; if κ differs from 0, then the combination m1 ⊕m2 is a
bpa over D defined as follows:
(m1 ⊕m2)P = 0 if P =  , else:
(m1 ⊕m2)P = (ΣP1,P2 | P1∩P2=P • m1 P1 ×m2 P2)/κ
where
κ = (ΣP1,P2 | P1∩P2 6=  • m1 P1 ×m2 P2)
It is easily checked that whenever m1 ⊕ m2 is defined, it
is a bpa; notice that κ equals “the sum of all m1 ⊕ m2-
results if normalization ‘/κ’ were left out of ⊕’s definition”.
More precisely, κ = “the above (Σ . . .) except that part
‘P1 ∩ P2 = P ’ is extended with ‘for some P 6=  ’. ”
Generalization: Conditioning (and Tupling)
11 Conditioned bpa
Let D be a finite set. A conditioned bpa over D , c-bpa for
short, is a total function m : D ×D  [0, 1] such that:
m (P | Q) = 0 whenever P ∩Q = 
ΣP ,Q • m (P | Q) = 1
Consistent with common practice in probability theory, we
separate the two arguments of a c-bpa with a ‘|’ rather than
a comma, and interpret the second one as the condition and
the first one as the conclusion.
The belief, plausibility, and ignorance induced by m are de-
fined as follows:
Bel (P | Q) = ΣP ′,Q ′ | P ′⊆P ∧ Q ′⊇Q • m (P ′ | Q ′)
Pl (P | Q) = 1− Bel (D \ P | Q)
Ig (P | Q) = Pl (P | Q)− Bel (P | Q)
12 Interpretation
A c-bpa m is interpreted as an agent, having conditioned
evidences. Specifically, the statement m (P | Q) = x is
interpreted as follows:
Agent m has evidence x supporting just P provided
that a proposition fromQ is true; if the condition is not
fulfilled, the evidence supports just D unconditionally.
Due to the exhaustiveness of the set D of propositions, there
cannot be any evidence for P | Q in case P ∩ Q is empty.
The interpretation of the condition plays also an important
role in the combination of two c-bpa’s.
13 Combination of c-bpa’s
Let m1 and m2 be c-bpa’s over D . If constant κ defined be-
low equals 0, then the combination of m1 and m2 is said not
to exist; if κ differs from 0, then the combination m1⊕m2 is
a c-bpa over D defined as follows — with an indispensable(!)
explanation following the definition:
(m1 ⊕m2)(P | Q) = 0 if P ∩Q =  else:
(m1 ⊕m2)(P | Q) =
(Σ P1,Q1,P2,Q2
| P ′1 ∩ P
′
2 = P ∧ Q
′
1 ∩Q
′
2 = Q
where
P ′1,Q
′
1 = (if Q1 ⊆ D\P2 then * , *
if P2 ⊆ Q1 6⊆ D\P2 then P1, *
if P2 6⊆ Q1 6⊆ D\P2 then P1,Q1 ),
P ′2,Q
′
2 = (if Q2 ⊆ D\P1 then * , *
if P1 ⊆ Q2 6⊆ D\P1 then P2, *
if P1 6⊆ Q2 6⊆ D\P1 then P2,Q2 )
• m1 (P1 | Q1)×m2 (P2 | Q2)
) / κ
The first clause is an immediate consequence of the obser-
vation in paragraph 12. We shall now explain the second
clause. Let P ,Q be arbitrary with non-empty intersection.
The summation constraint in between ‘|’ and ‘•’ character-
izes the possible P1 | Q1 and P2 | Q2 that in combination
support just P | Q ; precisely for these P1,Q1,P2,Q2 the
product m1(P1 | Q1) × m2(P2 | Q2) is taken into the sum-
mation for P | Q . We explain the characterization of P1,Q1
only; the characterization of P2,Q2 is similar.
In the general case, the evidence that agents 1 holds
in support for P1 | Q1 will, in combination with the
other agent, support just P1 ∩ ... | Q1 ∩ ... (where the
dots ... stand for the contribution of the other agent):
the intersection in the conclusion is the same one as
for normal bpa’s, and the intersection in the condition
expresses a conjunction of the conditions. However,
for agent 1 there are two circumstances that lead to a
change of its contribution in the combination.
• First, agent 1’s condition Q1 might be inconsistent
with the other agents conclusion P2 (Q1 ∩ P2 = 
or, equivalently, Q1 ⊆ D\P2). The interpretation of
paragraph 12 says: “if the condition is not fulfilled,
the evidence supports just D unconditionally.” So,
agent 1’s evidence supports, in the combination, just
P ′1 ∩ ... | Q
′
1 ∩ ... where P
′
1,Q
′
1 = *, *. This is covered
by the first branch for P ′1,Q
′
1.
• Second, agent 1’s condition Q1 might be implied by
the other agents conclusion P2 (P2 ⊆ Q1 or, equiva-
lently, P2 ⊆ Q1 6⊆ D\P2). In the combination, then,
condition Q1 is fulfilled and may be weakened to *. So,
agent 1’s evidence supports, in the combination, just
P ′1 ∩ ... | Q
′
1 ∩ ... where P
′
1,Q
′
1 = P1, *. This is covered
by the second branch for P ′1,Q
′
1.
Note. Recall that the condition of m1 requests
the truth of a member in Q1 whereas P2 ⊆ Q1
only asserts some evidence supporting Q1. Yet,
the condition is discarded, by putting Q ′1 = *.
This is justified since the combination m1 ⊕ m2
doesn’t assert any truth but only some evidence.
• In the remaining (“general”) case, as we have said
above, agent 1’s evidence supports, in the combination,
just P ′1 ∩ ... | Q
′
1 ∩ ... where P
′
1,Q
′
1 = P1,Q1. This is
covered by the third branch for P ′1,Q
′
1.
It remains to define κ; it must make the total sum over
m1 ⊕ m2 equal to one. Hence, κ is defined to be “the sum
of all m1 ⊕m2-results if normalization ‘/κ’ were left out of
⊕’s definition”. Equivalently, take κ = “the above (Σ . . .)
except that part ‘P ′1 ∩ P
′
2 = P ∧ Q
′
1 ∩ Q
′
2 = Q ’ is extended
with ‘for some P ,Q with P ∩Q 6=  ’. ”
14 Example
Take D to be a set of numbers, partitioned into small and
large, with tiny ⊂ small and huge ⊂ large, and let even,
odd , prime have their conventional meaning. Consider the
following c-bpa’s:
m1 = {(small | *) 7→ 0.4, (huge | prime) 7→ 0.6}
m2 = {(even | large) 7→ 0.3, (odd | tiny) 7→ 0.7}
Then the combination m1 ⊕m2 is computed as follows:
small | * 0.4 small ∩ * | * ∩ * small ∩ odd | * ∩ tiny
huge | prime 0.6 — (see note †) huge ∩ * | prime ∩ *
0.3 0.7
m1
~w m2 =⇒ even | large odd | tiny
Note †: huge ∩ even | prime ∩ * is discarded since
huge ∩ even ∩ prime ∩ * = 
For the upper-left rectangle of the “square”, note that m1’s
condition * is implied by m2’s conclusion even (that is,
* ⊇ even), so m1’s evidence for small | * is dealt with as
small | * in the combination (the * is discarded and replaced
by *); further, m2’s condition large is inconsistent with m1’s
conclusion small (they have an empty intersection), hence
m2’s evidence for even | large is dealt with in the combina-
tion as * | *. Similarly for the lower-right rectangle. For
the upper-right rectangle, note that m1’s condition * is im-
plied by m2’s conclusion odd (that is, * ⊇ odd), so that m1’s
evidence for small | * is dealt with as small | * in the com-
bination (the * is discarded and replaced by *); and further,
m2’s condition tiny is not implied by m1’s conclusion small
and these two are not inconsistent (tiny ∩ small 6=  ), so
m2’s evidence for odd | tiny is dealt with unchanged in the
combination. For the lower-left rectangle, we have the same
situation as for the upper-right rectangle. However, since
huge ∩ even ∩ prime ∩ * =  (that is, “P ∩Q =  ” — there
are no huge even primes), the evidence for the combined
case huge ∩ even | prime ∩ * must be zero by definition of
the notion of c-bpa. All together:
m1 ⊕m2 = { (small | *) 7→ 0.12/κ,
(small ∩ odd | tiny) 7→ 0.28/κ,
(huge | prime) 7→ 0.42/κ }
where
κ = 0.12 + 0.28 + 0.42
15 Tupling
So far, the formal definitions assume that there is a sin-
gle domain of discourse, D . However, in the CIA-example
there are clearly several distinct domains: Name, Type, and
Speed . In order to deal with such a situation, we need to ex-
tend Dempster-Shafer theory, and our generalization with
conditioning, in such a way that several domains can be
dealt with simultaneously. This is achieved by the notion of
“tupled-bpa” (t-bpa, for short). It is not hard to do so, but
space limitations do not permit us to give the details.
In fact, the notion of t-bpa is superfluous in the sense that
normal bpa’s can already express (although in a rather com-
plicated and unpractical way) what we wish to express with
t-bpa’s. This came for us as a little surprise, because in
general
 
D1 × · · · ×
 
Dn and
 
(D1 × · · · × Dn) are quite
different; the explanation, however, is that the former can
be embedded in the latter. For example, take t-bpa m over
D = (D1,D2) as follows:
m = {. . . , ({a, b, c}, {p, q}) 7→ x , . . .}
This m can be viewed as denoting the following normal bpa
m ′ over D ′ = D1 ×D2:
m ′
= {..., {a, b, c} × {p, q} 7→ x , ...}
= {..., {(a, p), (a, q), (b, p), (b, q), (c, p), (c, q)} 7→ x , ...}
So, m ′ maps a subset P of D1×D2 to 0 except when P
happens to be equal to pi1P × pi2P , in which case m
′ P = x
iff m(pi1P , pi2P) = x — where pii is the projection of a set
of tuples to coordinate i , that is, pii P = {(x1, x2) : P • xi}.
Formally, the normal bpa m ′ that represents the t-bpa m,
is defined as follows:
m ′ P = if P = pi1 P × pi2 P then m (pi1 P , pi2 P) else 0
The construction is fully general, as can be proved formally.
Similarly for the combination of conditioning and tupling:
ct-bpa. Again, space restrictions do not permit us to give
the details.
Extending the Relational Model
Having generalized Dempster-Shafer theory with condition-
ing and extended it with tupling as well, the formal defini-
tions of the well-known classical Relational Model and our
new one look very similar — even for the join operation.
This is one half of our goal (the other half being the condi-
tion that conditioning expresses indeed what we intuitively
wish to express). We want to show the similarity here, in
particular for the join operation, without intending or at-
tempting to explain the formulas. For the die-hards that
nevertheless do want to understand every detail (which is
not necessary to observe the similarity!), we provide some
missing definitions in the appendix: paragraph 21–23.
16 The classical Relational Model
Let (A,D) be a schema (definition omitted). A relation over
(A,D) is a subset of ΠAD (definition omitted). We let R
vary over relations, and r over members of R. Then we
define:
Projection piBR = {r : R • B  r}
Transformation f * R = {r : R • f r}
Selection σPR = {r : R | r ∈ P} = R ∩ P
Join. For i = 1, 2, let (Ai ,Di) be a schema, and Ri be
a relation over (Ai ,Di) such that the domain assignments
agree on the common attributes: D1 a = D2 a for all a in
A1 ∩A2. Then:
R1 ./ R2 =
{r1 : R1; r2 : R2 | “function r1 ∪ r2 exists” • r1 ∪ r2}
Recall that functions are sets of argument-result pairs, so
that for functions f and g the union f ∪ g is a well-defined
set; it denotes a function again if f and g agree on their
common arguments. So, since D1 and D2 are assumed to
yield the same results on A1 ∩ A2, the expression D1 ∪ D2
denotes a proper function. If some D1 and D2 have a differ-
ent domain for some common attribute a, then R1 ./ R2 is
not defined. Note that, here, the condition “function r1 ∪ r2
exists” formally means: (∀ a : A1 ∩ A2 • r1 a = r2 a). The
join is a relation over (A1 ∪A2,D1 ∪D2).
17 Relations with uncertainty and ignorance
Let (A,D) be a finite schema. A relation-with-uncertainty-
and-ignorance over (A,D), ui-relation for short, is a set of
ct-bpa’s over (A,D). We let letter R range over ui-relations,
and letter m range over members (being ct-bpa’s) of R. We
define:
Projection piBR = {m : R • B J m}
Transformation f * R = {m : R • f m}
Selection σPR = {m : R | m∈P} = R ∩ P
Join. For i = 1, 2, let (Ai ,Di) be a finite schema, and Ri
be an ui-relation over (Ai ,Di) such that the domain assign-
ments agree on the common attributes: D1 a = D2 a for all a
in A1 ∩ A2. Then the join of R1 and R2, denoted R1 ./ R2,
is the ui-relation over (A1 ∪ A2, D1 ∪D2) that contains for
each pair (m1,m2) in R1×R2 the combination m
′
1⊕m
′
2 pro-
vided it exists (where m ′1 is the “obvious extension” of m1
to A1 ∪A2, and similarly for m
′
2):
R1 ./ R2 =
{m1 : R1; m2 : R2 | “m
′
1 ⊕m
′
2 exists” • m
′
1 ⊕m
′
2}
Within the above right-hand side, ct-bpa m ′1 over schema
(A1∪A2,D1∪D2) is constructed out of ct-bpam1 over (A1,D1)
by “extending m1 with * in the entries for all a /∈ A1”. For-
mally, m ′1 maps (P | Q) to positive x if and only if m1 maps
(A1  P | A1  Q) to positive x and for all a ∈ A\A1 we have
P a = Q a = * = D2 a:
m ′1 (P | Q) = if (∀ a : A\A1 • P a = D2 a = Q a)
then m1 (A1  P | A1  Q)
else 0
Similarly for the construction of m ′2 out of m2.
Note that the above definition of R1./R2 has the same struc-
ture as the definition of the normal join, which we consider
as a necessary condition in order to call our attempt success-
ful (and the attempt by Choenni et al. fails in this respect).
For both joins we find that only some pairs of the Cartesian
product of R1 × R2 will give rise to a row in the result, or
more specifically, when “the combination” of a pair of rows
exists, the pair contributes a row to the result, but when
“the combination” does not exist, the rows are considered
contradictory and the pair does not contribute to the result.
Hence, for both joins, the size of the join R1 ./ R2 may be
smaller than the size of the Cartesian product R1 × R2.
Discussion
Just presenting a set of formal well-formed definitions is in
itself no guarantee that some practical problem has been
solved. We do have the formal definitions, but we are not
yet sure that they give the outcome that one wants to have
in practice. For instance, does the initial relation SHIP
(borrowed from Choenni [1]) make sense (two rows about
Maria), and does our relation SHIP ′ makes sense? Is there
something special about keys, like Maria? We do not know
the final answers yet. We consider our work as an attempt
improve the sketch by Choenni for encoding ignorance in
the relational model.
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18 Appendix: Interpretation of bpa
Referring to paragraph 8, we interpret the finite D as an ex-
haustive set of distinct propositions about some topic: D is
the frame of discernment. We imagine that there are infal-
lible agents that in some way or another may have obtained
evidence for sets of propositions; more precisely, an agent
m may have for subsets P of D “evidence of amount x sup-
porting just P”, meaning that agent m is certain to degree
x that a proposition in P is true. We denote this fact by:
m P = x
We assume that only the ratio between the various evidences
matter, so that an amount of evidence is expressed as a num-
ber in [0, 1]. Moreover, in order that the agents can compare
and combine their findings, we assume that each agent nor-
malizes his evidences; thanks to the exhaustiveness of D we
can do it in such a way that the sum of all evidences is one:
ΣP • m P = 1. The sum is well-defined thanks to finiteness
of D . Since set D is exhaustive, it is impossible that there is
evidence for the empty set of propositions: m  = 0. Since
the propositions are distinct, different p, p ′ ∈ D denote dif-
ferent propositions, so that there is no need for constraints
that relate m {p} to m {p ′}. Such an agent m, then, is for-
mally characterized by a bpa.
In practice, an agent will have evidences only for some sub-
sets of D . In that case, we stipulate that the agent has
evidence 0 for each missing P 6= D .
Note that an agent may have evidence x supporting just P
and also another evidence supporting just a subset P ′ of P ;
in this way the agent may differentiate between the individ-
ual propositions of D . The following indifference principle is
crucial (for the definition of combination in paragraph 10):
“Evidence x supporting just P” does not distinguish
between the individual propositions in P : it allows for
arbitrarily differentiated evidences for the individual
propositions and subsets of P by some other means.
In particular, m({p1, . . . , pn}) = x does not imply or follow
from m({pi}) =
x
n
for i = 1 . . n; these two assertions will
lead to distinct beliefs (defined below).
Further following the above interpretation, it is natural to
say that for an agent m, the belief in P is the sum of all
evidences supporting parts of P . In addition, the plausi-
bility in P is the “un-belief” in the complement of P , and
ignorance in P is the difference between the plausibility and
belief in P .
Note that the “weakest” set of propositions is D itself, since
evidence for the set D gives no information at all; in par-
ticular, evidence 1 for D (and consequently evidence 0 for
every proper subset of D) signals complete ignorance.
19 Appendix: Intuition of Dempster’s ⊕
Shafer “provides no conclusive a priori argument for Demp-
ster’s rule” but sees that “the rule does seem to reflect the
pooling of evidence, provided. . . ” [3, page 57]. He explains
the rule by interpreting the definition for m1 ⊕m2 in a ge-
ometrical way as in Figure 2. Here we try to give “a moti-
vated intuition” for Dempster’s combination rule presented
in paragraph 10.
Let D be a frame of discernment. Consider two independent
agents characterized by m1 and m2, respectively. In what
way can the two agents further act as one, combining their
evidences? For this, we make the following observations:
(i) The infallibility and independence of the agents implies
that each agent wants to combine each “piece of evi-
dence” held by the other with all his own evidences,
in such a way that it is done proportionally to his own
evidences.
(ii) The indifference principle implies that for both agents
together the evidences supporting P1 according to agent 1
and supporting P2 according to agent 2 together sup-
port P1 ∩ P2, provided this intersection is nonempty.
Elaborating this, we find the following:
• According to the notion of bpa, the empty set of propo-
sitions is not supported at all.
• According to (i) there exists a constant c1 for agent 1
such that each “piece of evidence” m2 P2 is ‘combined’
with each P into evidence c1 ×m1 P ×m2 P2 that, ac-
cording to (ii), supports P ∩P2, provided this intersec-
tion is nonempty.
• Symmetrically, according to (i) there exists a constant
c2 for agent 2 such that each “piece of evidence” m1 P1
is ‘combined’ with each P into evidence c2 × m1 P1 ×
m2 P that, according to (ii), supports P1∩P , provided
this intersection is nonempty.
For the sake of symmetry we take c1 = c2, and define κ =
1/c1 = 1/c2, and we have established the defining equations
for m1 ⊕m2.
Regarding the value of κ, we notice that in order that the
combination is a bpa, all evidences must sum up to 1, and
therefore κ must be equal to the sum of all summands in
the defining equations for m1 ⊕ m2. It follows that when
κ = 0, no subset P of D is supported by evidence of both
m1 and m2. In that case the two agents cannot agree in
accordance with the principles; the evidences that they hold
are contradictory, and the combination of m1 and m2 simply
does not exist. This concludes my intuition for the definition
of m1 ⊕m2.
Figure 2 geometrically relates various items mentioned above
to each other, and can be used to organize an actual com-
putation of a bpa combination.
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In the 1-dimensional representation of a bpa m, a line of
length 1 is divided into segments; there is a bijection be-
tween sets P and segments, and the length of the segment
for P equals the evidence m P supporting P .
In the 2-dimensional representation of m1 ⊕m2, a square
with area 1 is divided into rectangles; a rectangle repre-
sents some evidence (proportional to the size of its area)
supporting some P . There is however no bijection between
the subsets P and the rectangles: different rectangles may
represent evidences supporting the same P , and some rect-
angles may not represent evidence for an P at all. In par-
ticular, the shaded rectangle has area m1 P1 ×m2 P2, and
(m1 P1 × m2 P2)/κ is considered combined evidence sup-
porting P1 ∩ P2, provided this intersection is nonempty.
In case P1 ∩ P2 =  , then the shaded area is not used
as combined evidence, and therefore the total amount of
evidences in the square may sum up to less than 1.
Figure 2: Geometrical representation of the items
in the definition of m1 ⊕m2
20 Appendix: Attack and defense
The following criticism on Dempster’s combination⊕ is well-
known. Consider the following two agents in the context of
D = {p1, p2, p3}:
m1 = {{p1} 7→ 0.9999, {p3} 7→ 0.0001}
m2 = {{p2} 7→ 0.9999, {p3} 7→ 0.0001}
So, each agent i believes almost certainly in proposition pi ,
and considers p3 very unplausible. Yet, their combination
gives full certainty to p3, which might be considered counter-
intuitive:
m1 ⊕m2 = {{p3} 7→ 1.0}
The defense is clear: in view of the infallibility of agents,
proposition p3 is the only one that can be true according to
both agents together. Truth of an proposition with very low
but positive plausibility is not inconsistent with an agents
view of the world.
Some formal denitions
We give some of the missing definitions; space limitations
do not permit to give all.
21 Appendix: Schema
A pair (A,D) of a set A and a function D that maps each
a ∈ A to a [finite] set, is called a [finite] schema.
Given a schema (A,D), the notion of labeled products ΠAD
and Π

AD make sense, as explained in the next paragraph.
22 Appendix: Labeled products
Members of a product D1 × · · · × Dn are called tuples and
denoted (x1, . . . , xn). Unfortunately, for some manipulations
the concepts of product and tuple, with the ellipses “. . .”-
notation, do not work well (for example, the “union” and
“join” are not easy to express). The formulas work out far
more beautiful and manipulatable when we view a tuple
(x1, . . . , xn) as a function x = {1 7→ x1, . . . ,n 7→ xn}, so
that x i = xi . Correspondingly, D is viewed a function D =
{1 7→ D1, . . . ,n 7→ Dn} with D i = Di , and the role of
D1 × . . . × Dn is now taken over by ‘the set of functions x
with x i ∈ D i ’, denoted by Π1..nD . In short, we exploit the
following isomorphism (≈):
(x1, . . . , xn) ≈ {1 7→ x1, . . . , n 7→ xn} = x
D1× · · ·×Dn ≈
„
the set of functions x
with ∀ i : 1..n • x i ∈ Di
«
= Π1..nD
Actually, we can now generalize a bit, and use arbitrary
set A instead of 1 . .n to label the components: the set ΠAD
is a labeled product, and a member of ΠAD is an A-labeled
tuple over D :
ΠAD = the set of all functions x with domain A
satisfying ∀ a : A • x a ∈ D a
Example. Take:
A = {Name, Age, Sex }
D = {Name 7→ Text , Age 7→ Number , Sex 7→ {‘F’, ‘M’}}
r = {Name 7→ ‘Alice’, Age 7→ 13, Sex 7→ ‘F’ }
r ′ = {Name 7→ ‘Bill’, Age 7→ 50, Sex 7→ ‘M’ }
Then, r and r ′ are A-labeled tuples over D , that is, r , r ′ ∈
ΠAD . Imposing an order on A, say A = (Name,Age,Sex ),
and using the conventional tuple notation, these equations
read:
A = (Name, Age, Sex )
D = (Text , Number , {‘F’, ‘M’})
r = (‘Alice’, 13, ‘F’ )
r ′ = (‘Bill’, 50, ‘M’ )
Now r , r ′ ∈ D1 × D2 × D3. The order on A, namely ‘first
Name then Age then Sex ’, is absent in the A-labeled tuples
but essential in the conventional tuple notation. The con-
ventional tuple notation necessitates an order on A (thus
forcing some overspecification), whereas the labeled prod-
ucts and tuples don’t do so.
(End of example.)
Generalizing slightly, we also define labeled products and
tuples that are set-valued (with Pi ⊆ Di):
(P1, . . . ,Pn) ≈ {1 7→ P1, . . . ,n 7→ Pn} = P
 
D1× · · ·×
 
Dn ≈
„
the set of fcts P with
∀ i : 1 . . n • P i ⊆ Di
«
= Π

1..nD
So,
Π

AD = the set of all functions P with domain A
satisfying ∀ a : A • P a ⊆ D a
23 Appendix: Domain restriction
Let f be a function with domain A; then the domain restric-
tion of f to set B is the function λ a : A∩B • f a, for which
we introduce the abbreviation: B  f .
Let (A,D) be a finite schema, m be a ct-bpa over (A,D),
and B ⊆ A. The restriction of m to B , denoted B J m, is
the ct-bpa over (A,D) obtained from m by changing in each
entry the conditions and conclusions for A\B into *, and si-
multaneously also, if the change has effect on the conditions,
the other conclusions of the entry:
(B J m) (P | Q) = 0 if ¬ (∀ a : A \ B • P a = * = Q a),
else:
(B J m) (P | Q) = ΣP ′,Q ′
| (∀ a : B • Q ′ a = Q a) ∧
if Q ′ = Q
then (∀ a : B • P ′ a = P a)
else P = *¯
• m (P ′ | Q ′)
For example, take A = 1 . . 3 and B = 1 . . 2 and consider,
using the conventional tuple notation:
{(a0, b0, * | a, b, * ) 7→ v ,
(a0, b0, c0 | a, b, * ) 7→ w ,
(a1, b1, c1 | a, b, c ) 7→ x ,
(a2, b2, c2 | a, b, c
′) 7→ y }
This ct-bpa is mapped by BJ to the following ct-bpa:
{(a0, b0, * | a, b, * ) 7→ v + w ,
( * , * , * | a, b, * ) 7→ x + y }
